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Introduction
Development which relies in varying degrees upon the
export of manufactured goods is not a new phenomenon.
It was in many ways significant in the early development
experiences of a number of the advanced industrial
countries. Indeed, stressing the role of exports and the
importance of the foreign trade multiplier, Kaldor
¡1977! has argued that the growth of all rapidly
industrialising countries has been export-led.
The most recent school to advocate export-oriented
industrialisation (EOI) as the appropriate strategy for
the developing countries has sought its justification
not so much in the historical experience of the earlier
industrialisers as in the reputed failures of import-
substituting industrialisation (ISI). In general, this
school has a theoretical and policy perspective associated
with the orthodox growth .and-modernisation approach
to development, and it sees EOI as the strategy through
which a Rostow-type development process could be
initiated and sustained in the developing countries,
where ¡SI failed see Keesing 1967; Little, Scitovsky
and Scott 1970; Balassa 1971; Myint 1972; Johnson
1973; ¡LO 1974; and Little 1979!.
The proponents of the EOI strategy argue that it
would promote a form of industrialisation which would
be more efficient and internationally competitive, and
more in tune with the employment needs of developing
countries, because it would be concerned with
developing production in lines in which these countries
have an obvious comparative advantage, namely, labour-
intensive manufactures. Starting on these lower rungs
of manufacturing, these countries could, over time,
progress towards more sophisticated manufacturing
activities. All this would go along with the opening up
of the economy, greater reliance on the free-market
price mechanism, the elimination of impediments on
trade, investments and other financial flows, and
generally increased integration with the international
economy.
However, the critics of this strategy allege it has high
economic and social costs, such as the increasing
dependence of the economies concerned and the
growing exploitation of their labour-forces, and argue
against both the desirability and the likelihood of the
long-term success of the strategy. The main force of
their arguments is that the EOI strategy has served to
promote an influx of foreign investment, mostly by
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metropolitan multinational companies (MNCs) whIch
have generally established processing and assembly
plants, utilising cheap local labour for largely unskilled
and labour-intensive parts of the production process.
Such production is generally based upon the import of
most or all of the key manufacturing inputs (with high
value added operations and R and D activities confined
to the metropoles), in operations which are externally
vertically integrated. The general consequence is that
minimal benefit (in terms of local linkages, local
learning and local control of the production process)
accrues to the developing country involved, while
maximum advantage accrues to the MNCs (in terms of
control over production, pricing, profits and general
economic leverage over the local labour force and the
local state) ¡ see Sutcliffe 1971, pp 270-80; Helleiner
1973; Trajtenberg 1976; AMPO 1977; Nayyar 1978;
and Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye 19801.
This paper seeks to draw out the implications of the
experience of the EOI strategy in Singapore for these
opposing views and in particular, to assess the extent
to which it challenges the dependency approach.
Development Strategy: the Context and the
Policies Adopted
Development efforts in Singapore should be viewed in
the context of a relatively new and very vulnerable
political entity, attempting to establish a place for
itself in an unstable and changing world a small
island city-state which has sought to overcome the
immense domestic and external pressures impinging
upon it through undertaking the most rapid form of
development open to it. With a population of only
about two million, a land area of only 616 sq km,
resulting in high population density and strong pressures
on employment opportunities, it has traditionally been
dependent on trading and other service activities and
on imports of energy resources, raw materials and
food for its population and production activities. Despite
the rapid growth of industry, the tertiary sector as a
whole continues to be the dominant economic sector.
Following the break from Malaysia in 1965 the city-
state was left with only its small domestic market. The
economic strategy (up to this point largely ¡SI) was
consequently modified to emphasise export-oriented
industries that would cater for the general world
market. The MNC then seemed to be an ideal ally in
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this regard, because it had the technical expertise
which could help to raise local skills, its labour-
intensive operations would create substantial employ-
ment, and it had established access to foreign markets.
Moreover, the entrenchment of foreign capital, expertise
and other supporting institutions in the country would
ensure external interest in the survival and continued
growth of the city-state. Consequently, the main thrust
of the economic strategy was to integrate the domestic
economy more closely with the international economy,
with the associated aim of maximising the rate of
economic growth.
The policies associated with this strategy involved
offering fiscal incentives, providing an extensive and
modern infra-structure, redefinition of the contractual
relationship between employers and employees,
imposition of restraints upon the local labour movement,
the import of foreign labour, and a general policy of
wage restraint. There was an acceptance of the fact
that foreign investors are primarily profit-seeking.
The concessions provided were justified by reference
to the employment opportunities and the access to
developed country markets provided, in particular by
the MNCs.
Less attention and support was provided to the generally
smaller local firms and industries, because they were
mainly engaged in processing and repairing activities
not oriented towards export. Insofar as these local
industries harboured a significant proportion of the
labour force while the new industries encountered
increasing labour shortages, justifications were found
to eliminate, directly or indirectly, many of the local
establishments and to rationalise the rest to be more in
tune with the overall industrialisation strategy.
An important aspect of the problem was that the city-
state had not traditionally had as strong an involvement
in manufacturing as, for instance, Hong Kong. This
posed serious difficulties for any indigenous efforts to
develop a significant and internationally competitive
manufacturing sector in the short or. medium term.
Instead, it was thought that an open-door' policy
would be more successfuldespite its costs. And,
based upon a realistic assessment of the difficulties
involved in acquiring and developing sophisticated
technology, an equally pragmatic approach was
formulated for the longer-term development of domestic
technical skills at the same time as immediate
opportunities were exploited for the application of
intermediate skills see Geiger and Geiger 1975:24-Sl.
The general strategy was formulated and implemented
in a period when developed country economies were
still experiencing relatively high rates of growth. The
initiation of the strategy also coincided with growing
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competition between major US European and Japanese
firms, and increasing US direct foreign investment.
These investments were directed largely towards Europe,
to take advantage of the relatively more rapid growth
rates, lower wages and higher productivity, to expand
the total world market share of US firms and also to
hedge against decline in the value of the US dollar.
However, many subsidiaries were also established in a
number of developing countries, to benefit from the
cheaper cost of labour, employed in processing and
assembly activities vertically integrated into the broader
international operations of US MNCs, so as to acquire
a competitive edge over European and Japanese
firms.
The response of European and Japanese firms to this
challenge from US companies has been varied, but it
also includes more direct foreign investment on their
part and the transfer of certain production activities to
a number of developing countriesnot so much to
expand market shares in those areas themselves (as
previously) but rather to follow US MNCs into externally
vertically integrated production processes capitalising
upon cheaper labour sources. These, then, were the
conditions under which the introduction and rapid
growth of export-oriented manufacturing occurred in
Singapore and, with some variations, in a number of
other Asian countries.
Structural Change In Manufacturing and
Associated Developments
In 1965, direct exports of manufactures from Singapore
constituted only 32 per cent of total sales value in the
manufacturing sector. If the criterion for an export-
oriented industry is taken as direct exports accounting
for 50 per cent or more of total sales, only four
industry groups qualified as such. They were textiles
(including wearing apparel) and footwear (SSIC 23+24),
leather products (SSIC 29), rubber products (SSIC
30), and electrical machinery (SSIC 37). Together,
these four industry groups contributed only about 17
per cent of all direct manufactured exports. The
greater part of direct manufactured exports was
contributed by other industries which were primarily
catering for the local market. The relative insignificance
of the export industries at this time is further evidenced
by the fact that they accounted for only about 14 per
cent of all manufacturing establishments, 19 per cent
ofthe labour force and 9 per cent of the net value of
fixed assets in the sector. They also contributed only 8
per cent of total output and about 9 per cent of all
value added in manufacturing.
The experience during the transitional period 1965-68
showed the existence of serious constraints on export
markets for developing country manufactures in the
area of standard light consumer products, such as
those that characterised Singapore's export industries
in 1965. The potential for rapid and sustained
industrialisation on this pattern was limited by restrictions
on access to developed country markets, barriers
posed by import-substituting policies in other developing
countries, and not least, by the prior entrenchment of
other export-oriented developing countries like Hong
Kong and Taiwan in these lines of production.
Between 1968 and 1974 there was a boom in the
export industries, based on a diversification into
electronics, precision instruments, shipbuilding and
repairing, oil-rig construction, and a major expansion
of petroleum refining. These developments were part
of the influx of foreign investment and the proliferation
of MNC subsidiaries. During this period, wholly foreign
firms contributed 45 per cent of the increase in the
number of workers employed in manufacturing, 63
per cent of the growth in output. and 53 per cent of the
growth in value added.
In this period the export industries came to dominate
all the significant aspects of manufacturing, reversing
their position vis-à-vis the domestic-oriented industries
in the earlier phase. They grew at very rapid rates and
contributed about 90 per cent or more of the total
increase in employment, wages, fixed assets, output,
value added, subcontracted production, total sales
and direct exports. The experience during this period
showed the vast potential for growth in manufactured
exports based on a more diversified industrial struc-
ture.
The number of industry groups oriented towards
export increased from 3 in 1968 to 11 in 1974. These
developments in manufacturing brought about significant
changes in the content and composition of trade.
Where direct exports accounted for only 33 per cent
of total sales in 1965, the ratio was 65 per cent in 1978.
Between 1965 and 1978 the value of direct exports
increased 36 times.
Since 1969, domestic manufactures have accounted
for more than half of all domestic exports and the
earlier tradition of entrepôt trade was transcended in
1974 when domestic exports exceeded re-exports. By
1978 foreign dominated firms accounted for 52 per
cent of the workers employed, 71 per cent of total
output, 63 per cent of all value added, 53 per cent of
employees' remuneration. 72 per cent of total sales
and 84 per cent of direct exports from the sector.
While foreign firms have been the most important in
export-manufacturing activities, the increasing impor-
tance of local firms in export industries should also be
noted. Where in 1968 only 15 per cent of wholly local
firms were involved in export-oriented industries, the
proportion had risen to 44 per cent in 1978. While
wholly local firms were themselves responsible for
only 8 per cent of direct manufactured exports in
1978, compared to 71 per cent by wholly foreign firms,
the extent of their increased involvement in the export
industries suggests that important linkages may have
developed between local and foreign firms. This
association may be significant, even though the total
proportion of subcontracted production in the export
industries is very low, because the absolute values
involved are quite substantial. For instance, while
total subcontracted production for all export industries
in 1978 was only 2 per cent of output, it amounted to
SS299.5mn.
This general transformation of manufacturing provided
the basis for the rapid growth of the sector as a whole.
The contribution of manufacturing to total GDP
increased from 15 per cent in 1965 to 26 per cent in
1977. Over 1968-78, its real contribution to GDP grew
at an average annual rate of 24 per cent, while total
GDP grew by 15 per cent in corresponding real terms.
For the economy as a whole, GDP at constant (1968)
factor cost grew at an average annual rate of il per
cent from S52,780mn in 1965 to S$10,089mn in 1978.
In 1978 indigenous GNP (SS I 3,979mn) was 20 per cent
less than overall GNP at current market prices
(S$17,423mn). Although these differences are certainly
significant, they seem much smaller than what might
be expected from the manner and extent of the city-
state's pursuit of the EOI strategy.
The number of manufacturing establishments employing
10 or more workers almost trebled in the period 1965-
78, while the number of workers employed increased
five-fold. During the same period, female employment
increased 8.5 times, compared to a three-fold increase
in male workers. At the same time, output increased
18 times while value added and net fixed assets both
grew about 13 times. By 1974, manufacturing had
replaced commerce as the category of economic
activity providing the most employment.
Despite the generation of a large amount of low wage
and particularly female employment and the import of
large numbers of foreign workers, the high rates of
growth of the export industries after 1968 helped to
transform a 'labour surplus' situation into one of
relative labour scarcity. The official unemployment
rate for the whole economy declined from 9 per cent
of the labour force in 1965 to less than 4 per cent in
1978, despite the fact that the labour force had grown
from 557,000 to 975,000 and the participation rate had
also increased from 55 io 63 per cent during that
period.
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In addition to manufacturing, there have been other
important growth sectors in the economy. These
include banking and finance, transport and communica-
tions and other service activities. Although developments
in these areas may be less notable, they are nevertheless
quite significant. These areas of activity were, in many
cases, relatively easier for local entrepreneurs to venture
into and to operate quite profitably within, even in the
face of direct or indirect foreign competition. Local
interests had been able to profit from local knowledge,
local associations and access to privileged operating
conditions, so as to make these activities the bases for
local capital accumulation. These bases have grown
over time and in a number of cases have expanded
beyond domestic operations, with local finns internation-
alising their own operations to a significant degree. In
this regard, an important development is the growing
role of state enterprises in the economy.
The combined result of these and other developments
has been a more diversified economic structure. The
city-state has been transformed from a primarily entrepôt
trading centre prior to 1965, to a centre of manufacturing,
commercial, financial, transport and communications
activities at present. The diversification of the economy
has contributed, on the one hand, to a more stable
domestic economy as the fluctuations in any individual
sector are partly balanced by compensating develop-
ments in other sectors; and on the other hand, to an
increasing intermeshing and mutual stimulation of the
different economic sectors. All this contributes to a
general climate of dynamism and growth in the economy,
which, although still vely much affected by external
influences, yet manifests a certain degree of autonomy
in its operations.
There has also been a general improvement in the
standard of living. Education and training opportunities
have rapidly expanded, and the massive public housing
programme now provides accommodation for about
60 per cent of the population. While there remains
room for further improvement in the social services in
relation to the needs of the poor, recent estimates
suggest that there has been a marked decline in the
general level of absolute poverty. Moreover, although
equity was not a major objective of the economic
strategy, various studies suggest that there has been
some improvement in the general pattern of personal
income distribution.
These changes in the economy and society as a whole
suggest that the room for development in this very
dependent city-state, for the period reviewed, has
been wider than the critics of the general strategy
perceived it to be I see Buchanan 1972). The achieve-
ments also indicate the important degree to which
domestic policies, institutional arrangements and
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leadership may be able to influence and extend that
scope. For despite its vulnerability, Singapore has
been able to develop and adapt to change to a greater
extent than its mere size and resource base seemed to
allow.
Problems and Prospects
If dependence and underdevelopment are not necessarily
associated, in the manner postulated by many of the
critics of the EOI strategy, neither are (continuing)
growth and development as definite an outcome of
the strategy as its advocates imply. In Singapore, the
export industries in particular, and the manufacturing
sector in general, experienced a decline in 1974-75.
Subsequently, there has been a recovery, but with
growth rates significantly below those achieved in the
period 1968-74. These developments were due to the
emergence of serious external and domestic con-
straints.
The onset of the general international recession has
changed the situation significantly. It marked the end
of the previous phase of rapid growth of the developed
country economies and the intensification of competitive
pressures between countries and firms. Reduced growth
and technological development towards fully automated
production processes in advanced industrial countries
are also tending to diminish the industrial servicing
role of Singapore and other developing countries. In
addition, there has been a significant change in general
climate for the EOI strategy, given increased pressures
by trade unions in the West against the 'export of jobs'
to new industrialising countries, complaints by various
developed country producers about 'unfair competition'
and associated demands for import restrictions, and a
growing criticism of low-wage export-oriented industrial-
isation as a general strategy for the developing coun-
tries.
Yet another worrying consideration is the extent to
which competitive pressures may build up between
various developing countries as a direct consequence
of their common pursuit of the strategy, which may
lead them, in effect, to pit their respective low-wage
labour forces against one another. Certain changes
may also seriously undermine the principal basis of
Singapore's EOI strategy, such as the IMF's recent
attempt to reclassifî Singapore as a 'developed' country.
Among other things, the effect would have been to
exclude the city-state from access to various export
markets and official financial credits under preferential
terms.
Other problems arise from the inadequate extent of
domestic linkages in manufacturing and from the fact
that foreign firms have not promoted locally-based
technological developments. In addition to foreign
capital being dominant in manufacturing and providing
the major part of its exports, these exports generally
involve a vely high level of intra-firm trade. This
implies that the city-state pays a higher price, relative
to more independent producers, for the inputs associated
with the closely MNC-integrated structure of its
manufactured exports. It also means its exports are to
some extent shielded from developed countly restrictions
set up to restrain the penetration of independently
promoted manufactured exports.
However, the earlier boom in the export industries
and their recent resurgence have revealed a major
domestic labour constraint on the continued pursuit
of the strategy. They have encountered increasing
labour shortages, initially for skilled male workers, but
eventually also for unskilled and low-wage female
production operatives, at current rates of remuneration.
Upward pressures on wage rates have tended to make
some export industries less competitive than those of
other developing countries. The problem was earlier
partly resolved by the import of temporary foreign
workers. However, a continuation of this would soon
increase their numbers immensely relative to the city-
state's indigenous population and labour force, and
intensify general population pressures. For the labour
shortage has increasingly become a structural problem
for the economy as a whole I see Ker 1977 I. Moreover,
the general policy of wage restraint has tended to
compound these problems, serving to entrench the
less productive and lower growth economic sectors
and discouraging the more productive and higher
growth sectors isee Pang 1979J.
These developments together suggest a need, over the
medium term, for the city-state to diversify away from
export-oriented manufacturing in its present form, if a
relatively high rate of growth is to be sustained in the
economy. The perception of this has led the government
to make a variety of responses. It has sought to attract
even more foreign investment by shifting incentives
into production involving more technologically
sophisticated manufacturing operationsan upgrading
of the earlier strategy. The general objective is to
promote the manufacture of selected high value added
products and skill-intensive operations in which the
country might have sufficient comparative advantage.
In support, greater attention and resources are being
allocated to the promotion of local technological
development.
A recent major policy initiative reversing the previous
policy of general wage restraint, aims to further this
structural shift to a more productive and higher-wage
economy J see Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 August
1979:40-44 J. With the new economic policy, it is
envisaged that low-wage, low-skilled and low value
added operations wouki be phased out by the deliberately
increased labour costs, while employers would be
motivated to economise on labour through organisational
rationalisation and general restructuring of production.
It is thought that this policy wilkclear the bottlenecks
on productivity increases and on the general upgrading
of skills, which would constitute the new bases for
international competiveness.
The outcome of these measures is as yet uncertain.
Much will depend on the strategies and policies adopted
in other countries and among firms, particularly the
MNCs, in response to continuing recession and growing
international competitive pressures.
Conclusion
Various domestic and external constraints on Singapore
led it to adopt the EOI strategy. Its development
experience since 1965 has served as a test of both the
possibilities and the limits of the strategy.
To the extent that Singapore has become more closely
integrated into the international economy, it is
increasingly subjected to the pressures and strains
generated within that system. At the same time, however,
various changes occurring within that system provide
new opportunities for it. Furthermore, as a small
island city-state, achievements and breakthroughs of
less than global significance can be very important for
it. So it could continue to find a suitable niche in the
international division of labour to provide relatively
high rates of growth and the basis for continued
development, even under the present constrained
economic situation. The earlier phase of the strategy
provided the time and opportunity for the growth,
diversification and upgrading of several sectors of the
economy and the transformation of many aspects of
the society.
Nevertheless, the constraints and pressures which the
country faces are considerable. In attempting to establish
an even more diversified, integrated and dynamic
economy, capable of providing the basis for a higher
general standard of living in the country, the leadership
seems deeply conscious of the likely difficulties ahead.
It has emphasised the sustaining of rapid adaptation to
change, to keep ahead of emerging problems.
Between the general structural constraints and the
specific policy options and practical initiatives that
can still be undertaken, lie a whole range of cumulative
and interactive effects and possible historically unique
events, which prevent the longer term outcomes from
being predetermined. Much of what would affect the
city-state will originate abroad and will be beyond its
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capacity to control, but not entirely beyond its capacity
to seek more or less positive adjustments in response.
We are confronted by the reality of dependence' not
as some frozen state, but as a generally constrained
situation which is itself subject to change in various
different ways. And this specific development experience
suggests that both the advocates and the critics of the
EO1 strategy were wrong, each differently, in a way
that reveals the situation to be more complex for the
late-developing countries than either group originally
perceived.
First, the successes derived, directly and indirectly,
from the adoption of EOI in Singapore are not as
easily generalisable as many of those who wish to
promote the model would suggest. The city-state had
various advantages (among others, its location, the
quality of its economic and social infrastructure, and
the economic and political skills of its leadership)
which helped its efforts at development through EOl.
At the same time, other developing countries less
constrained than Singapore, in resources, mestic
markets and indigenous manufacturing capabilities,
either do not need to adopt the EOl model, or not in
the form or to the extent that Singapore has done.
Secondly. the advocates of the strategy overestimated
the extent to which the international economy would
be flexible, expansive and accommodating of manu-
factured exports from developing countries. Even the
existing relatively low level of such exports has caused
developed country interests to be alarmed and to
press for various measures of restraint.
The advocates clearly failed to specify the general
conditions on which the strategy depended, and failed
to see that its applicability would be restrictedsuitable
for particular countries during specific periods. They
neglected the self-undermining elements in a process
of change, failing to see that the very success of the
strategy would, in certain ways. create new difficulties
and constraints for the countries concerned.
However, the critics of the strategy were too pessimistic
and neglected significant developments in the new
industrialising countries. These developments and the
implications of the perception in some quarters in the
West of the threat posed by the new Japans' have not
been fully confronted.
From a historical perspective, the critics have also
ignored the earlier development experiences of Japan
and the other western industrialisers after Britain,
classifying them as inherently a part of the 'centre',
and assuming that what was possible in the phase of
competitive capitalism is no longer possible in the
phase of 'monopoly capitalism'. I For a critique of this
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thesis, see Clifton 1977 and Wirth 1977 I.ln this way, it
could be contendedeg against Warren I 19731that
there has not been a real instance of the successful
capitalist development of a peripheral country.
The critics of ED! have also largely approached the
issues in general and global terips, without sufficient
regard for the different phases of the international
economy, the specificities of individual countries, and
the contribution of specific organisational and institu-
tional arrangements. Moreover, they generally operate
with an ideal type. it not utopian. image of the
development process. against which the realities of
the experience of peripheral country development are
consequently found wanting. They fail to give sufficient
consideration to the specific possibilities and over-
generalise the perceived limits. They too ignore an
important aspect of development processes. that is,
the ongoing changes in the centre-periphery system.
and the complex and uneven (rather than simple and
unambiguous) character of economic and social
transformation within and between countries.
While the reality and seriousness of the problems
associated with dependence cannot be denied, the
totality and conclusiveness of that experience cannot
be maintained. The critics take too monolithic a view
of international capitalism, overstate the sway of the
MNCs. neglect the significance of domestic developing
country constraints, and are unable or slow to detect
qualitative changes in a general situation. Several of
these difficulties are closely related to problems with
the broader thesis, which overemphasises and over-
generalises the association between dependency and
underdevelopment. For dependence, where it exists,
is clearly not the only problem and may not always be
the most serious impediment to development. Any
assessment of the EOl strategy and its potential for
development must involve a consideration of both the
changing international context and the country-specific
situations so as to provide a keener perception of
possibilities and constraints during a specific period.
note: the more general dependency references are flot given
here but in the bibliography at the end of this Bulletin.
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